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FAMILY LAW
Sharon K. Lieblich *
I. INTRODUCTION
That the Court of Appeals of Virginia has reached its maturity
is evident from the court's recent decisions, which rarely break
significant new ground. The last two years have seen the court
mainly applying established principles in new contexts, and the
most interesting cases tend to be the ones whose unusual facts
make them stand out. Consider, for example, L.F. v. Breit, in
which a mother who had acknowledged the paternity of the bio-
logical father of her child argued-unsuccessfully-that because
they had used in vitro fertilization the father had no parental
rights.' At the other end of the spectrum are the many cases that
do not even reach the merits because of some procedural failing
on the part of the appealing party, such as not preserving the is-
sue for appeal' or failing to include the issue in the opening brief.'
The General Assembly and court of appeals have attempted to
dig out of the hole created by the decision in Hoy v. Hoy by
amending Virginia Code section 20-113 to give Virginia courts the
authority to enter a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO")
or other order enforcing a support order and attaching any pen-
sion, profit-sharing, or deferred compensation plan as permitted
by the Internal Revenue Code or other federal law.' But there
seems to be no escape from the rule that the designation of a ben-
* Partner, Lieblich & Grimes, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia. LL.M., 1969, The George
Washington University Law School; LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1963, Bar-
nard College.
1. 285 Va. 163, 186, 736 S.E.2d 711, 724 (2013), affg Breit v. Mason, 59 Va. App.
322, 718 S.E.2d 482 (2011),
2. VA. SUP. CT. R 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
3. VA. SUP. CT. R 5A:20 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
4. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 39, 2012 Va. Acts 55 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-113 (Cum. Supp. 2012)); Nkopchieu v. Minlend, 59 Va. App. 299, 312, 718
S.E.2d 470, 477 (2011); see Hoy v. Hoy, 29 Va. App. 115, 119, 510 S.E.2d 253, 255 (1999).
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eficiary of federal life insurance prevails over all legislative ef-
forts to require the beneficiary to convey the proceeds to the wid-
ow of the deceased.
The court of appeals continues to issue mostly unpublished de-
cisions, many of which seem appropriate for publication.' Some-
times an unpublished decision will address a legal issue of first
impression, and even if the facts are quite unusual, it seems un-
duly reticent of the court not to publish the case.
II. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. Case Law
1. Use of Affidavit in Contested Divorce Case
Cruz v. Cruz was the first appellate test of new Virginia Code
section 20-106(A)(iii), which allows a party to submit evidence in
the form of an affidavit in a case where the defendant has been
served "and has failed to file a responsive pleading or to make an
appearance as required by law."' The wife filed for a divorce on
grounds of separation for more than one year.' The husband was
personally served with the complaint in Saudi Arabia, where he
then resided, and he filed an objection to service and motion to
quash process." The motion was denied, and the husband then
moved for dismissal on the grounds that the marriage was void
ab initio because of bigamy." The husband did not file a docu-
ment denominated as an answer to the complaint or other re-
sponsive pleading."
5. Maretta v. Hillman, 283 Va. 34, 44-45, 722 S.E.2d 32, 36-37 (2012).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-413 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
7. See, e.g., Gerensky-Greene v. Gerensky, No. 1801-11-4, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 206,
at *12 (Va. Ct. App. June 19, 2012) (unpublished decision) (recognizing that a motion to
modify custody is a cause of action and may be nonsuited, but order of nonsuit is not final
until court expressly so orders); Goodwin v. Flinn, No. 1413-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS
189, at *15.16 (Va. Ct. App. June 5, 2012) (unpublished decision) (affirming the trial
court's decision that wife must bear monetary consequences of her refusal to sign deed so
husband can refinance residence).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-106 (Cum. Supp. 2012); Cruz v. Cruz, 62 Va. App. 31, 741
S.E.2d 71 (2013).
9. Cruz, 62 Va. App. at 33, 741 S.E.2d at 71.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 33-34, 741 S.E.2d at 71-72.
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At the hearing on the husband's motion, the wife sought to in-
troduce an affidavit to corroborate her testimony that the parties
had been separated for more than a year." She argued that in the
absence of a responsive pleading from the husband, she was enti-
tled to rely on Virginia Code section 20-106(A)(iii)." The trial
court rejected the affidavit, holding that section 20-106(A)(iii) is
inapplicable when the defendant has entered an appearance.
Without the affidavit, the wife had no corroborating evidence, so
"[t]he trial court granted [the] husband's motion to strike and
dismissed the case."" The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. 7
The purpose of section 20-106(A)(iii) was to create an exception to
the general rule that testimony is to be given orally in open
court."
The [statute] is most naturally read to impose two separate circum-
stances ... either of which will defeat divorce by affidavit or deposi-
tion without leave of court. This reading is not only consistent with
the plain language of Virginia Code section 20-106(A)(iii), it also is
consistent with the overall purpose of Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-106(A)(iii).' 9
2. Statute of Limitations on Support Orders
The statute of limitations on suits to enforce judgments applies
to individual child support payments. In Adcock v. Common-
wealth, Department of Social Services, the father had been or-
dered to pay child support in 1966, and his payment obligation
continued through 1982, when the youngest child was emancipat-
ed.20 The father was in arrears and never made it up.2 1 At the
mother's request, the Virginia Department of Social Services
("DSS") moved to reopen the parties' case to establish the arrear-
age plus interest, and to set a payment plan.22 The father re-
sponded that the motion was untimely under Virginia Code sec-
13. Id. at 34, 741 S.E.2d at 72.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 33, 38, 741 S.E.2d at 71, 74.
18. Id. at 37, 741 S.E.2d at 73-74.
19. Id., 741 S.E.2d at 73.
20. 282 Va. 383, 386, 719 S.E.2d 304, 305-06 (2011), rev'g 56 Va. App. 334, 693 S.E.2d
757 (2010).
21. See id., 719 S.E.2d at 306.
22. Id.
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tion 8.01-251(A), which states "[n]o execution shall be issued and
no action brought on a judgment .. . after 20 years from the date
of such judgment."2 3 The court of appeals, purporting to follow
Bennett v. Commonwealth, Department of Social Services, held
that unliquidated support orders, which require payments on
dates in the future, were not "judgments" within the scope of the
statute." The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that
support orders require payment of money in specified amounts on
dates certain." The dates may be future dates, and the payments
prospective payments at the time of the order, but each payment
becomes a judgment on the due date if not paid by then.26
The opinion makes it clear that each installment of an ongoing
support obligation is a judgment from the date it is due and not
paid, potentially giving rise to situations in which some parts of
past-due support obligations are time-barred and some are not.
Although there is something to be said for treating the mother in
this case like any other dilatory judgment holder, the special na-
ture of support-and particularly child support, which no parent
can waive on behalf of a child-affords a basis for distinguishing
this case and enforcing the obligation.
3. No Interstate Transfer of Spousal Support Jurisdiction
In O'Neil v. O'Neil, the court of appeals discussed how the cir-
cuit court issued a final decree in 2005 ordering the husband to
make monthly payments of spousal support." The decree trans-
ferred further issues of spousal support to the Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations ("JDR") court. 8 In 2010, the husband moved in
JDR court to amend the order on spousal support.29 The JDR
court denied the motion, and the husband appealed to the circuit
court.o The circuit court, on its own motion, transferred the case
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-251(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Adcock, 282
Va. at 386, 719 S.E.2d at 306.
24. Adcock, 282 Va. at 388, 719 S.E.2d at 307 (citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 56 Va. App. 334, 344, 693 S.E.2d 757, 762); see Bennet v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 15 Va. App. 135, 147, 422 S.E.2d 458, 465 (1992).
25. Adcock, 282 Va. at 389-90, 719 S.E.2d at 307-08.
26. Id.
27. 60 Va. App. 156, 157, 724 S.E.2d 247, 247-48 (2012).
28. Id., 724 S.E.2d at 248.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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to a court in Louisiana where both parties and their witnesses
were living, but the court of appeals reversed."
The court of appeals grounded its decision in Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-88.43:2, which provides that a court that enters an order
of spousal support has continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify
that order." The circuit court had relied on section 8.01-265, Vir-
ginia's forum non conveniens law, which allows a court to dismiss
an action brought by a nonresident "if the cause of action arose
outside the Commonwealth and if the court determines that a
more convenient forum ... is available." Although Virginia has
not formally adopted the official comments to the Uniform Inter-
state Family Support Act ("UIFSA"), of which section 20-88.43:2
is a part, the court of appeals quoted from the comment as fol-
lows: "The issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdic-
tion over an order of spousal support throughout the entire exist-
ence of the support obligation."34 As between UIFSA and the more
general forum non conveniens law, UIFSA prevails.
4. Dispositional Order Must Be Appealed Within Ten Days
In Blevins v. Prince William County, Department of Social Ser-
vices, the JDR court adjudicated that a child, who had been living
with his grandmother, had been neglected." In May 2010, the
court entered a "dispositional order" giving legal custody to DSS.36
The May order scheduled an interim review for June." In June,
the court amended its May dispositional order and granted the
child's mother physical custody while DSS retained legal custo-
dy." The June order set a foster care review hearing for Novem-
ber 2010." Fifteen days after the June order the grandmother
filed notice of her appeal of the foster care review and of the find-
31. Id. at 156-57, 724 S.E.2d at 247-48.
32. Id. at 160, 724 S.E.2d at 249 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.43.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008 &
Cum. Supp. 2013).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 2007); see O'Neil, 60 Va. App. at 157, 724
S.E.2d at 248.
34. O'Neil, 60 Va. App. at 159, 724 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 211 cmt. at 204 (2001) (amended 2008); 9 U.L.A. 204-05 (1996)).
35. 61 Va. App. 94, 97, 733 S.E.2d 674, 676 (2012).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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ing of abuse and neglect."o On an appeal to the circuit court which
was heard de novo, DSS argued that the grandmother's appeal
was untimely because the May order giving DSS legal custody
was a final order." The court agreed and ruled that the grand-
mother could not challenge either the adjudication of neglect or
the initial dispositional order.4 2
The court of appeals affirmed, acknowledging that ordinarily a
dispositional order would not be considered "final."43 A disposi-
tional order does not "dispose[ of the whole subject" and "leaves
[something] to be done," because Virginia Code section 16.1-278.2
contemplates the possibility of court review of the placement de-
termined in the order." But that very code section contains a pro-
vision stating that a dispositional order is "a final order from
which an appeal may be taken."45 The reasoning behind this pro-
vision, said the court, is to resolve issues of custody quickly in the
best interests of the child.6 By statute, a court conducting a dis-
positional hearing-may rule on issues of custody. 7 So the May or-
der "unquestionably was a dispositional order."4 ' The grandmoth-
er had ten days to appeal and failed to do so. The opinion points
out that just because a dispositional order of the kind involved
here may call for review in the future, that does not preclude the
finality of its underlying ruling-here, a change of custody from
the parent or grandparent against whom an adjudication of ne-
glect has been made.4 9
5. Only the Circuit Court that Entered the Original Decree Can
Modify It
In Williams v. Williams, the parties had obtained a decree of
divorce from Fauquier County Circuit Court."o The decree includ-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 98, 733 S.E.2d at 676.
44. Blevins, 61 Va. App. at 96, 98, 733 S.E.2d at 675-76; see VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
278.2 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
46. Blevins, 61 Va. App. at 99, 733 S.E.2d at 677.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.2 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
48. Blevins, 61 Va. App. at 100, 733 S.E.2d at 677.
49. Id. at 101, 733 S.E.2d at 677-78.
50. 61 Va. App. 170, 172-73, 734 S.E.2d 186, 187 (2012).
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ed provisions relating to child support, which was to be paid
through the Department of Child Support Enforcement
("DCSE")." The trial court never transferred the case to Fauquier
JDR court or any other court.52 Some years later, after both par-
ties had moved to Fairfax County, the mother moved in Fauquier
JDR court (to which the case had never been transferred) for a
transfer of the case to Fairfax County JDR Court for modification
of child support." The father then moved in Fairfax County Cir-
cuit Court for modification of child support, arguing that the cir-
cuit court was the "proper and preferred venue" for the case.54
DSCE moved to intervene in the father's case, arguing that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction." The judge in Fairfax County
Circuit Court agreed with DCSE and dismissed the case, adopt-
ing DCSE's memorandum as her holding."
The court of appeals affirmed.5 ' No provision of Virginia law al-
lows the transfer of a case from one circuit court to another.5 ' The
Fairfax Circuit Court could take no action in the case and there-
fore lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Subject matter
jurisdiction, unlike territorial jurisdiction, or venue, cannot be
waived or conferred by agreement of the parties." It is true that
under Virginia Code section 20-96 every circuit court in the
Commonwealth has jurisdiction over cases of divorce and support,
but the father was seeking a modification of child support, which
is not the same thing."o Virginia Code section 20-108, which ap-
plies to modifications, states "[t]he court may, from time to time
after decreeing as provided in § 20-107.2 . . . revise and alter such
decree."" By conferring this jurisdiction on "the" court and stating
that the jurisdiction comes "after decreeing," the law makes clear
that the jurisdiction inheres solely in the circuit court that en-
tered the original decree.
51. Id. at 173, 734 S.E.2d at 187.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 173-74, 734 S.E.2d at 187.
55. Id. at 174, 734 S.E.2d at 187.
56. Id. at 175, 734 S.E.2d at 188.
57. Id. at 184, 734 S.E.2d at 183.
58. Id. at 181, 734 S.E.2d at 191.
59. See id. at 176, 734 S.E.2d at 189.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013); Williams, 61 Va.
App. at 177, 734 S.E.2d at 189.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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B. Legislative Changes
There has been quite a bit of legislation affecting jurisdiction
and procedure during the past two years, some in response to ju-
dicial decisions, some to simplify or disambiguate existing proce-
dures.
1. One simplification is of particular interest to family law
practitioners. The General Assembly has amended Virginia Code
section 20-99 to provide that when (1) a suit for divorce or an-
nulment action has been filed, (2) service has been made on the
defendant in conformity with the provisions of Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-296(1), and (3) the defendant has failed to file an answer
to the suit or otherwise appear within the time permitted by law,
no further notice to take depositions is required to be served on
the defendant and "the court may enter any order or final decree
without further notice to the defendant."62
2. In another simplification, Virginia Code section 20-106 has
been amended to permit a party in a no-fault divorce case, where
the parties have a Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") that
resolves all issues, to file an affidavit or deposition containing ev-
idence in support of the divorce, without leave of court.63 The
same procedure is also available when the defendant has been
personally served with the complaint and has failed to respond.64
The law itself sets forth the mandatory contents of the affidavit.
3. Subsection L has been added to Virginia Code section 20-
107.3. This subsection states that if it appears, upon or after en-
try of a final decree, that neither of the parties lives in the juris-
diction where the decree was entered, the court may transfer au-
thority for further proceedings to the circuit court where either
party resides."
4. Virginia Code section 26-81(B)(3) has been amended and
reenacted as Virginia Code section 64.2-1608 to state that unless
provided otherwise, a power of attorney is terminated when a pe-
62. Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 84, 2012 Va. Acts 112, 113 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-99(5) (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
63. Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 72, 2012 Va. Acts 102, 102-03 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-106(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-106(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
65. Act of Mar. 7, 2012, ch. 144, 2012 Va. Acts 212, 215 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
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tition for custody or visitation of a child of both the principal and
agent is filed or, if they are married, when a suit for divorce, an-
nulment, or separate maintenance is filed by either agent or prin-
cipal." Despite this automatic revocation, the document itself will
remain unaltered. Therefore, it is important to serve written no-
tice of cancellation on the holder, and perhaps on some persons
and institutions that might be acting in reliance on the power of
attorney, notwithstanding the statute.
5. Virginia Code section 16.1-241 has been amended to give
JDR courts jurisdiction over protective orders in cases involving
abuse of, or by, a juvenile and to allow JDR judges to prohibit
contact between the abuser and allegedly abused person, as well
as the allegedly abused person's family." Several other sections
were amended to conform to this change, and a clarification that
the protective order can cover family members as well as the
abused person was added.68 These amendments should make it
easier to get judicial protection and orders for exclusive use of a
family residence in cases where the alleged abuser focuses abuse
on a child in the home, rather than a parent. For example, the
statute makes it clear that a parent wishing to protect a child
who is being beaten by the other parent can get the abusive par-
ent out of the home.
III. PREMARITAL AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS:
"GROSS" REALLY DOES MEAN "GROSS"
In Craig v. Craig, the court of appeals construed a PSA to avoid
double deductions from pension payments under a QDRO." The
trial court had entered a QDRO incorporating provisions of the
parties' PSA, which, among other things, provided for the wife to
receive a 37.5% share of the husband's gross pension from the
federal government, specifically describing it as 37.5% "of the
HUSBAND'S gross monthly annuity.""o The QDRO used compa-
66. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 57, 2012 Va. Acts 80, 80 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-1608(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
67. Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 637, 2012 Va. Acts 1339, 1341 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(M) (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
68. Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 637, 2012 Va. Acts 1339, 1342-43, 1347 (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2, -253.4, 19.2-152.8, -152.11 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
69. 59 Va. App. 527, 538, 721 S.E.2d 24, 29 (2012).
70. Id. at 532, 721 S.E.2d at 26.
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rable terms, including the word "gross."n A proviso in the same
paragraph of the PSA stated that the cost of the wife's survivor
benefit would be deducted from the wife's share when she re-
ceived the benefits.7 2 The QDRO, again, contained a substantially
identical provision."
When the Federal Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")
calculated the monthly amount the wife would receive, it applied
its own specialized definition of "Gross Monthly Annuity"
("GMA") as found in its regulations." That definition provided
that the cost of the survivor benefits would be subtracted from
the total amount in order to calculate the GMA." The OPM de-
ducted the cost of the survivor benefit once in order to calculate
the GMA, which meant that the wife was paying 37.5% of the
survivor benefit. OPM deducted an identical amount a second
time to implement the QDRO, which reduced the monthly pay-
ment by the total amount of the survivor benefit.7 ' The result was
that in the aggregate, the wife was paying 137.5% of the cost of
that survivor benefit, while receiving only 37.5% of the pension
(minus the two survivor-benefit deductions).
The wife sought a court order acceptable for processing and re-
imbursement of unpaid benefits." The court ruled for the wife,
holding that the plain intent of the parties, as evidenced by their
agreement, was to use "gross" in its common usage and not in the
specialized sense in the OPM regulations." Citing Recker v. Reck-
er, the court of appeals held that terms like "gross annuity" were
to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of a clear indi-
cation to the contrary.7 9 The court determined that "gross" means
"an overall total exclusive of deductions.""o Nothing indicated an
intent to not use this meaning" because the QDRO was modified
to "conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 533, 721 S.E.2d at 27.
74. Id. at 534, 721 S.E.2d at 27.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 534-35, 721 S.E.2d at 27.
77. Id. at 534, 721 S.E.2d at 27.
78. Id. at 537-38, 721 S.E.2d at 29.
79. Id. (citing Recker v. Recker, 48 Va. App. 188, 629 S.E.2d 191 (2006)).
80. Id. at 537, 721 S.E.2d at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 537-38, 721 S.E.2d at 29.
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the order."" Virginia Code section 20-107.3(K)(4) confers jurisdic-
tion on Virginia courts to correct errors of expression in QDROs
to enable them to deal with situations like the one in Craig v.
Craig."
IV. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
A. Case Law
1. Issues Concerning Size of Marital Share and Choice of
Valuation Date
In Wright v. Wright, one of the issues was the division of one of
the husband's pensions, which had not yet vested." The husband
was a partner at Hunton & Williams." He argued that the court
should not award any of the pension to the wife because, under
the terms of the particular plan, the pension was not only unvest-
ed but was also as yet unearned.88 The trial court's finding that
the wife had contributed to the success of the husband's practice,
and therefore that a portion of the pension was marital property,
was affirmed by the court of appeals." However, because the trial
court had determined that twenty-five percent of the pension
should be awarded to the wife without actually determining what
the marital share was," the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded on that issue."
The court explained that the applicable statute, Virginia Code
section 20-107.3(G)(1), limits awards to the "marital share" of the
pension, with a maximum award amount of fifty percent of the
marital share."o The case was remanded to the trial court to de-
termine the marital share by dividing the total years the husband
had been a partner into the number of years during his partner-
82. Id. at 539, 721 S.E.2d at 29.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(K)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
84. 61 Va. App. 432, 450, 737 S.E.2d 519, 527-28 (2013).
85. Id, at 440-41, 737 S.E.2d at 523.
86. Id. at 450-51, 737 S.E.2d at 527-28.
87. Id. at 453-54, 737 S.E.2d at 529.
88. Id. at 443, 737 S.E.2d at 524.
89. Id. at 454-55, 737 S.E.2d at 530.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(G)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2012); Wright, 61 Va. App. at 450-
51, 737 S.E.2d at 528; see also Mosley v. Mosley, 19 Va. App. 192, 198, 450 S.E.2d 161, 165
(1994) (discussing Virginia Code section 20-107.3(G)).
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ship that occurred between marriage and separation." The trial
court must then determine what percentage of the marital share,
not to exceed fifty percent, goes to the wife. This percentage is to
be calculated based on the number of years the husband had been
an equity partner, not based on the total number of years the
husband worked at Hunton & Williams during the marriage."
The court of appeals then addressed the issues of valuation
date and marital waste. After the separation, the husband spent
marital assets totaling approximately $1,400,000 to pay his per-
sonal expenses and spousal support." The wife argued for the use
of the separation date for the valuation of marital property, be-
cause there was a lot more money in the marital accounts at the
time of separation than at the time of the hearing on valuation.94
But the trial court, purporting to follow Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-107.3(A), used the date of the hearing, which is the de-
fault rule." The trial court was apparently unpersuaded by this
provision in the statute: "Upon motion of either party . .. the
court may, for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of
justice, order that a different valuation date be used."96 The court
of appeals held that the decision on the valuation date was within
the sound discretion of the trial court and could be reversed only
for abuse of discretion." Citing Clements v. Clements, the court
stated that proof of waste was required in order for an alternative
valuation date to be used, and here the wife had not established
marital waste.
The wife argued that, in view of the husband's high income, he
could have made his post-separation expenditures from his sepa-
rate funds, and that it would be inequitable to allow him to bene-
fit from having used marital property to "unfairly diminish[ the
parties' marital equity."" The court of appeals was not persuaded,
and it said there are only two categories of post-separate expendi-
91. Wright, 61 Va. App. at 456, 737 S.E.2d at 531.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 462, 737 S.E.2d at 533-34.
94. Id. at 444, 737 S.E.2d at 525.
95. Id. at 449, 462-63, 737 S.E.2d at 527, 533-34.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
97. Wright, 61 Va. App. at 463, 737 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 40 Va.
App. 639, 647, 580 S.E.2d 503, 506 (2003)).
98. Id. at 464-65, 737 S.E.2d at 534-35 (citing Clements v. Clements, 10 Va. App.
580, 586, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990)).
99. Id. at 465, 737 S.E.2d at 535.
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tures: (1) those for proper purposes and (2) waste.' The trial
court was not required as a matter of law to consider the extent of
the husband's post-separation income in determining whether his
expenditures were waste."1' The "ends of justice" provision in the
statue suggests that a trial court could choose an alternate valua-
tion date even without a showing of marital waste, but no pub-
lished opinion so far has so held.o2
It appears that one result of this decision is that the wife
wound up bearing half the cost of her own spousal support during
the post-separation period. The legislature has done what it could
to prevent such a result with a statute that allows an alternate
valuation date "to attain the ends of justice," but the trial court
declined the implicit invitation and the court of appeals decided
that was within the trial court's discretion. This decision does
leave open the possibility that a trial court in a subsequent case
might be willing to address the issue, but the path of least re-
sistance is plainly to allow a spouse to spend as much of the mari-
tal estate post-separation as he or she wishes as long as it is not
utterly outrageous.
2. QDRO Used on Father's Retirement Account to Recover
Support Arrearage
The parties in Nkopchieu v. Minlend were only briefly married,
but nevertheless had two children.' The mother was awarded
$2,000 per month in pendente lite child support, but the father
never paid any support. 04 By the time the mother applied to the
trial court for enforcement in early 2011, the arrearage had
grown to almost $28,000.o' The father had left the country, and
there was no evidence that he ever returned to the United States
or intended to do so.o' Thus, the mother moved for entry of a
QDRO, offering a draft order to the trial court,' but the trial
court did not consider the order. Instead, the court held that it
100. Id. at 465-66, 737 S.E.2d at 535.
101. Id.
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013); Wright, 61 Va. App. at 466-67,
737 S.E.2d at 536.
103. 59 Va. App. 301, 301, 718 S.E.2d 472, 472 (2011).
104. Id. at 301-02, 718 S.E.2d at 472.
105. Id. at 302, 718 S.E.2d at 472.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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could not enter a QDRO to enforce support."o' The trial court stat-
ed that it was constrained by Hoy v. Hoy, in which the court of
appeals held that a QDRO could not be used to enforce a support
order."o0
The court of appeals reversed, distinguishing Hoy.' In Hoy,
the wife was seeking spousal support a full quarter-century after
entry of the final decree and was attempting to attach a retire-
ment account that had not even existed at the time of the final
decree."' By contrast, the mother in Nkopchieu was acting on be-
half of her infant children to enforce a support decree, and the
applicable federal law (the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, or "ERISA") allowed a QDRO that "relates to the provision of
child support."112 The case was remanded to the trial court for
consideration of the tendered QDRO, and to determine whether
the tendered QDRO complied with the requirements of ERISA."'
Given that Hoy v. Hoy was distinguished but not overruled in
this case, it is a good thing that the General Assembly enacted a
provision that overruled Hoy and made it clear that a QDRO is
available in all cases to enforce a support order, be it spousal or
child support.'14 That provision is discussed below.
3. Fault Matters in Distributing Marital and Hybrid Property
The trial court in Hamad v. Hamad granted the husband a di-
vorce on grounds of the wife's adultery." A substantial portion of
the assets subject to distribution consisted of gifts from the hus-
band's parents, but the evidence did not enable the trial court to
establish exactly what they had given him."' Thus, the court
awarded the husband sixty percent and the wife forty percent."
108. Id. at 304, 718 S.E.2d at 473.
109. Id. at 303-04, 718 S.E.2d at 473; see Hoy v. Hoy, 29 Va. App. 115, 119, 510 S.E.2d
253, 255 (1999).
110. Nkopchieu, 59 Va. App. at 308-09, 718 S.E.2d at 475.
111. Hoy, 29 Va. App. at 118, 510 S.E.2d at 254.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2006); Nkopchieu, 59 Va. App. at 305, 307, 718
S.E.2d at 473, 475.
113. Nkopchieu, 59 Va. App. at 312, 718 S.E.2d at 477.
114. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 39, 2012 Va. Acts 55, 55 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-113 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
115. 61 Va. App. 593, 596-97, 739 S.E.2d 232, 234 (2013).
116. Id. at 602-03, 739 S.E.2d at 237.
117. Id. at 603, 739 S.E.2d at 237.
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In explaining its ruling from the bench, the court admitted to its
inability to value the gifts exactly."' The court's letter order stat-
ed that it had taken the wife's adultery and also the source of the
funds into account in making the division."9 The court of appeals
affirmed, pointing out that distribution was a step separate from
classification.'20 Even if the trial court lacked evidence with which
to classify much of the property as other than marital, it could
take into account both spousal fault and the source of the funds in
making the distribution. 2 ' The trial court may have admitted to
some confusion in explaining its ruling, but the ruling was still,
in light of all the evidence before it, within its discretion.
B. Legislative Changes
In an apparent, belated reaction to the court of appeals' deci-
sion in Hoy v. Hoy, and echoing the decision in Nkopchieu v.
Minlend, Virginia Code section 20-113 has been amended to give
Virginia courts the authority to enter a QDRO or other order en-
forcing a support order and attaching any pension, profit-sharing,
or deferred compensation plan as permitted by the Internal Rev-
enue Code or other federal law.122 This applies to both child and
spousal support.
V. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
A. Case Law
1. FEGLIA Designation Prefers Designated Beneficiary to
Widow
In Maretta v. Hillman, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed the issue of preemption. 4 In this case, the husband had
118. Id.
119. Id. at 604, 739 S.E.2d at 238.
120. Id. at 604-05, 739 S.E.2d at 238.
121. Id.
122. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 39, 2012 Va. Acts 55, 55 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-113 (Cum. Supp. 2012)); see Nkopchieu v. Minlend, 59 Va. App. 299, 312, 718
S.E.2d 470, 477 (2011); Hoy v. Hoy, 29 Va. App. 115, 119, 510 S.E.2d 253, 255 (1999); su-
pra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
123. Ch. 39, 210 Va. Acts at 55 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-113 (Cum.
Supp. 2012)).
124. 283 Va. 34, 722 S.E.2d 32 (2012).
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divorced and remarried.'2 5 Before the divorce, the husband had
designated his then-wife as the beneficiary of his federal life in-
surance policy, using the form supplied by the federal govern-
ment.'26 The husband made no change in that designation upon
his divorce or remarriage, or at any other time.'2 7 The husband
then died, and the proceeds of his federal life insurance policy
were disbursed to his first wife.'28 The husband's widow sued to
require the first wife to turn the proceeds over to her.'29 The cir-
cuit court overruled the first wife's demurer and subsequently
granted summary judgment for the widow.' The case went di-
rectly from the circuit court to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which reversed.' 3'
The issue was federal preemption: were federal and state laws
inconsistent and, if so, did federal law prevail? The federal stat-
ute involved was the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance
Act ("FEGLIA")." Section 8705(a) of FEGLIA provides an order
of precedence for distribution of proceeds of such policies on death
of the insured.' First preference is given to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries designated by the insured and second preference is
given to the widow or widower.'3 4 Section 8709(d)(1) explicitly
states that FEGLIA preempts any state law relating to life insur-
ance proceeds to the extent it is inconsistent with federal law. '3
The two relevant state law provisions are Virgina Code sections
20-111.1(A) and (D).136 The former revokes any designation of a
spouse as a life-insurance beneficiary automatically upon divorce,
and it applies to all policies of life insurance.' Subsection (D)
deals with cases in which federal preemption would render sub-
125. Id. at 39, 722 S.E.2d at 33.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 33-34.
130. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 34.
131. Id. at 40, 46, 722 S.E.2d at 34, 38.
132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Maretta, 283 Va. at 37-39, 722
S.E.2d at 33.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) (2006).
134. Id.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1) (2006); see also Maretta, 283 Va. at 41, 722 S.E.2d at 34 (ac-
knowledging the preemption provision in 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1)).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2013); Maretta, 283 Va. at 37-38,
722 S.E.2d at 33.
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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section (A) ineffective."' Subsection (D) makes the former spouse
personally liable to the widow or widower for any proceeds of a
federal life insurance policy distributed to the former spouse,
which in effect impresses a constructive trust on the proceeds.'
This provision led the circuit court to enter judgment for the wid-
ow.140 Subsection (D) was also the provision that the Supreme
Court of Virginia declared preempted by FEGLIA.14 1
Justice Kinser wrote the majority opinion, and Justice
McClanahan dissented, joined by Justice Millette.'4 2 The majority
relied on two decisions of the United States Supreme Court that
interpreted statutes establishing life insurance for members of
the armed services.' The United States Supreme Court had
found that state law was preempted by federal statute.1" The ma-
jority in Maretta found no relevant distinction between the two
United States Supreme Court cases and the case before them."4
They acknowledged that the majority of the state courts consider-
ing the question had ruled against preemption, but they disa-
greed with the reasoning of these other courts.' The dissent em-
phasized the distinctions between the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the present case, arguing that Virgin-
ia should side with most other state courts on this issue.14 7
But what of those agreements that explicitly state that federal
life insurance will be retained for the benefit of the original
spouse, but then the insured spouse makes a change naming the
second spouse as the beneficiary? The majority opinion responds:
"The insured's beneficiary designation takes precedence over any
court order for divorce, annulment, or separation unless that or-
der has been received by the appropriate office prior to the in-
sured's death."'4 Thus, it is important to remember to file those
138. Id. § 20-111.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
139. See id.; Maretta, 283 Va. at 41-42, 722 S.E.2d at 35.
140. Maretta, 283 Va. at 39, 722 S.E.2d at 34.
141. Id. at 46, 722 S.E.2d at 38.
142. Id. at 37, 46, 722 S.E.2d at 33, 38.
143. Id. at 42-44, 722 S.E.2d at 35-36 (citing Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981);
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)).
144. Id. (citing Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655 (1950)).
145. Id. at 44-45, 722 S.E.2d at 36-37.
146. Id. at 45-46, 722 S.E.2d at 37-38.
147. Id. at 51-53, 722 S.E.2d at 40-42 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 41, 722 S.E.2d at 35 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8705(e) (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 870.801(d)
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final orders of divorce with the benefits office where the insured
is employed.
The General Assembly has attempted to patch this blown tire
as best it can as explained in the subsection on legislation.
2. Request for Reservation of Spousal Support in Motion for
Reconsideration Is Effective
The case of Wright v. Wright, discussed above in the section on
equitable distribution, also resolves an important issue concern-
ing spousal support.14 In Wright, the wife included a request for
spousal support in her complaint, and the trial court awarded her
four years of support in its initial letter ruling.' On motion for
reconsideration, the wife sought a reservation of the right to re-
ceive support beyond the four years, and in a subsequent decree
the trial court granted her that reservation, but it did not specify
the duration of the reservation, which by default meant that the
reservation was for the presumptive length for such a reservation
under Virginia Code section 20-107.1(D), that is, half the length
of the marriage."' The husband argued that because the wife's
complaint did not specifically request a reservation of spousal
support, the trial court could not grant such a reservation and
that the request in the motion for reconsideration had come too
late. "2
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on this issue, fol-
lowing Visicchio v. Visicchio."' In Visicchio, the court of appeals
held that a request for a reservation of spousal support was in-
herent in the request for support itself."' Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-107.1(D) permits award of both support for a fixed term
and a reservation of support beyond the end of the fixed term.
Having requested spousal support in her complaint, the wife was
entitled to request a reservation at any time in the proceedings,
(2012)).
149. 61 Va. App. 432, 737 S.E.2d 519 (2013).
150. Id. at 443-44, 737 S.E.2d at 524.
151. Id. at 444, 737 S.E.2d at 524-25.
152. Id. at 444-45, 737 S.E.2d at 525.
153. Id. at 447, 737 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Visicchio v. Visicchio, 27 Va. App. 240, 498
S.E.2d 425 (1998)).
154. Visicchio v. Visicchio, 27 Va. App. 240, 254, 498 S.E.2d 425, 432 (1998).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
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and the prior award to her of four years of support did not bar her
request for a reservation beyond the end of the four years. ' 6
In a cross-appeal, the wife argued that the trial court had erred
in awarding her only four years of support."' Although she held
both an undergraduate degree in economics and an MBA, she had
not worked for compensation since their children were born.5 In-
stead, she raised the children and supported the social aspects of
her husband's practice."' She testified that she was too busy with
volunteer work to get a paying job.'60 The court of appeals held
that she was capable of supporting herself, and that the trial
court had not erred in allowing her no more than four years to re-
train as needed and find employment. 6'
3. Major Loss of Income Is Not a "Material Change in
Circumstances" for a Millionaire
The court in Driscoll v. Hunter confronted a case in which the
husband's income dropped dramatically, but he retained substan-
tial assets.'" The parties' PSA, incorporated into the final decree,
incorporated by reference an earlier agreement on pendente lite
support, which the parties had executed in 1998.163 The 1998
agreement stated that it was "without prejudice to the right of ei-
ther party to request the amount of child support and/or spousal
support to be determined by Court proceedings hereafter."6 4 The
1998 agreement also stated that the support agreement was
"without prejudice to the right of either party to have the child
support and/or spousal support to be set in judicial proceedings
without the necessity of a showing of a change in circumstanc-
es." "
156. Wright, 61 Va. App. at 446-47, 737 S.E.2d at 525-26.
157. Id. at 441-42, 737 S.E.2d at 523.
158. Id. at 443, 737 S.E.2d at 524.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 468-69, 737 S.E.2d at 536-37.
162. 59 Va. App. 22, 27-28, 716 S.E.2d 477, 479 (2011).
163. Id. at 26-27, 716 S.E.2d at 478-79.
164. Id. at 26, 716 S.E.2d at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In 2002, the husband, suffering from medical problems, closed
his oral surgery practice.166 His income dropped drastically, to the
point where his expenses exceeded his income.16 He eventually
brought suit for a reduction in, or suspension of, spousal sup-
port.168 The husband argued that the 1998 agreement, incorpo-
rated into the 2000 agreement and the final decree, excused him
from having to prove a material change in circumstances."' The
trial court, however, held that he had to make such a showing,
and when he argued to that court that his retirement was a ma-
terial change, the court held that his retirement was a change
that did not affect his ability to pay the support.' The trial court
therefore left the support amount where it had been."'
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 2000 agreement
and final decree, even though they purported to incorporate the
1998 agreement by reference, had the effect of superseding the
provision allowing a change in support without proof of a materi-
al change in circumstances.' The 1998 agreement, which was
pendente lite, was intended to be of only temporary effect, and the
purpose of the 2000 agreement was to establish a permanent
agreement."' The permanent agreement established permanent
support, supplanting the 1998 agreement, which contained the
provision requiring no proof of a material change in circumstanc-
es for a change in support. 174
The husband argued that his loss of income from his practice
was a material change."' Because he was spending more than he
was earning, the husband argued that his support should be re-
duced.7 6 The court of appeals, however, held that the issue is the
"ability of the supporting spouse to pay" when the trial court is
asked to modify an existing support obligation."' Investment in-
166. Id. at 27, 716 S.E.2d at 479.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 29, 716 S.E.2d at 479-80.
170. Id. at 28, 716 S.E.2d at 479.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 31-32, 716 S.E.2d at 481.
173. Id. at 31, 716 S.E.2d at 481.
174. Id. at 31-32, 716 S.E.2d at 481.
175. Id. at 27, 716 S.E.2d at 479.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 33, 35, 716 S.E.2d at 482-83 (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190,
195, 480 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 [Vol. 48:135
FAMILY LAW
come and potential withdrawals of principal are the same as
earned income for this purpose. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the husband's loss of earnings to be not "ma-
terial" as the statute requires.178
The lesson of this case is that simply proving a change in cir-
cumstances may not suffice to get a reduction of support. For a
change to be "material" and affect the amount of support, it must
be shown to negate the ability to continue to pay support at the
same level.17 1
4. Long-Distance Affair Is Not "Cohabitation"
The PSA in Cranwell v. Cranwell, incorporated into the final
decree, said that spousal support would cease upon the wife's re-
marriage or "cohabitation. . . in a situation analogous to mar-
riage with a person of the opposite sex for a period of one year or
longer."8 o The wife developed a long term "romantic," i.e., sexual,
relationship with a man who lived in California, but she contin-
ued to live in Virginia.'"' They spent nights together on a sporadic
basis as travel allowed, and they talked frequently on the
phone.'82 Each maintained a separate residence and had only a
few personal items at the other's residence.' Neither had a key
to the other's residence.'" There was no evidence that either fur-
nished financial support to the other."
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the
husband had not established "cohabitation" as required by the
parties' agreement.'86 Cohabitation "means a status in which a
man and woman live together continuously, or with some perma-
nency, mutually assuming duties and obligations normally at-
178. Id. at 34-35, 716 S.E.2d at 482-83.
179. Id.; see also Wright v. Wright, No. 0275-12-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 325, at *9 (Va.
Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2012) (unpublished decision) (increasing value of assets held by wife is
not a material change in circumstances); Smith v. Smith, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 148, at *7
(Va. Ct. App. May 8, 2012) (unpublished decision) (stating wife not entitled to continuing
support simply because husband's income has increased).
180. 59 Va. App. 155, 159, 717 S.E.2d 797, 799 (2011).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 159-60, 717 S.E.2d at 799.
183. Id. at 160, 717 S.E.2d at 799.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 159-60, 717 S.E.2d at 799.
186. Id. at 165, 717 S.E.2d at 802.
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tendant with a marital relationship.""' The wife and her "boy-
friend" (the court's term) plainly were not in such a situation. Be-
cause the agreement required a showing of cohabitation and no
such showing had been made, the other provisions relating to this
issue were irrelevant."'
B. Legislative Changes
In response to the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
Maretta v. Hillman, discussed above, a new Subsection E has
been added to Virginia Code section 20-111.1, requiring the inser-
tion of a provision in all final decrees of divorce or annulment to
inform the parties that beneficiary designations for death benefits
may not automatically change as a result of divorce or annul-
ment.'" New subsection E points out that insurers and other
companies that will pay the death benefit should be notified if a
change is intended, otherwise the former spouse may remain the
beneficiary.' The statute even provides model language to use to
provide notice. 9 ' It is, in the circumstances, the best the General
Assembly could do, but we will have to wait and see how effective
it proves in practice.
VI. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Legislative Changes
Virginia Code section 20-108.1(B)(3) has been amended by the
addition of a further item as part of the imputed-income factor for
the court to consider in determining whether to deviate from the
presumptive child support guidelines on account of voluntary un-
employment or underemployment."' The court may now consider,
when determining the reasonableness of employment decisions
187. Id. at 161, 717 S.E.2d at 800 (citing Frey v. Frey, 14 Va. App. 270, 275, 416 S.E.2d
40, 43 (1992)).
188. Id. at 164-65, 717 S.E.2d at 801-02.
189. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 493, 2012 Va. Acts 927, 928 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2012)); see Maretta v. Hillman, 283 Va. 34, 722
S.E.2d 32 (2012).
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
191. Id.
192. Act of Mar. 13, 2013, ch. 276, 2013 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
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for purposes of imputing income, whether a party has attended
and completed an "educational or vocational program likely to
maintain or increase the party's earning potential."'" The impu-
tation occurs if the court determines that a party could have ob-
tained such training but did not do so, just as has always been
true of employment. In addition, new Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-108.1(B)(4) adds a new factor for consideration when ap-
propriate: the child care costs necessary to enable the custodial
parent to attend "an educational or vocational program likely to
maintain or increase the party's earning potential."'94
Virginia Code sections 8.01-576.10 and 8.01-581.22 have been
amended.' Prior to the amendment, these statutes required the
disclosure of certain financial information used to compute child
support in the mediation process.'96 This information would be
disclosed to the opposing party and to the court, even when the
parties reached no agreement.' 7 That conflicted with the media-
tor's duty of confidentiality and this legislation eliminated the
conflict.
VII. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Case Law
1. The United States Supreme Court Rules on Appeal of
International Custody Order
In a rare venture into family law, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled on an issue involving the International Child Ab-
duction Remedies Act.' 9 In Chafin v. Chafin, the father was a
United States citizen serving in the military.'" While he was sta-
tioned in Germany, he married a British citizen and they had a
child.2 00 The mother returned to Scotland when the father was
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
194. Id. § 20-108.1(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
195. Act of Mar. 14, 2013, ch. 383, 2013 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.10, -581.22 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
196. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.10, -581.22 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
197. Id.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2006).
199. 568 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2013).
200. Id.
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transferred to Afghanistan, but he subsequently returned to the
United States and the mother joined him there.20 ' Soon after, the
father filed for divorce and custody in Alabama.20 2 The mother
was deported but the child initially stayed with the father.202 Sev-
eral months later, the mother filed a petition in United States
district court under the Hague Convention, seeking return of the
child to Scotland.20 4
The district court granted the petition on the grounds that the
child's country of habitual residence was Scotland. 20 5 The mother
and child then promptly returned to Scotland. 206 The mother then
filed for custody in Scottish court and was granted interim custo-
dy and a preliminary injunction prohibiting the father from re-
moving the child from Scotland.207 The husband appealed the dis-
trict court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, but that court, holding that the case was moot-
ed by the child's return to Scotland, remanded it to the district
court with instructions to dismiss the case. 2 0' The district court
did so, and it also ordered the father to pay $94,000 of the moth-
er's attorneys' fees and related costs in accordance with provi-
sions of the Hague Convention.209
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded in an
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. 2 10 A case is moot only if there is
no live controversy between the parties.2 '" The issue of the habit-
ual residence of the child (the United States or Scotland) was a
live controversy, as was the custody of the child, however unlikely
it may be that the father will prevail on the merits.212 The Ameri-
can court obtained personal jurisdiction over the mother, and that
court may yet find a way to exercise that jurisdiction if it deter-
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1022-23.
209. Id.
210. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1021, 1028.
211. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1023 (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.-,
, 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013)).
212. Id. at_ 133 S. Ct. at 1023-24.
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mines that the child should be returned to the father. 213 The Court
also pointed out that if a case became moot once a court allowed
the child out of the jurisdiction where it sits, courts would be re-
luctant to render a decision of such finality and might well refuse
to return the child even where appropriate.2 M
2. "Controlling" Decree Includes Unmodified Terms of Prior
Decree
This case, Moncrief v. Department of Child Support Enforce-
ment ex rel. Joyner, is not only a geography lesson, but also a per-
fect example of the transient nature of modern families." The
parties were divorced in New York in 1994, and the New York
court awarded child support through age twenty-one.216 With both
parties having left New York and the child residing in North Car-
olina with the mother, the mother applied in 1997 for a modifica-
tion of support based on a settlement between the parties.2 " The
North Carolina court entered an order modifying support and
making other changes to the New York decree but not changing
the expiration of support to age twenty-one.2 " The North Carolina
decree concluded that "[a]ll provisions of previous [o]rders not
modified herein shall remain in full force and effect."21 ' The only
previous order was the 1994 New York order.220
In 2009, the mother and child relocated to New York where the
mother moved for an order of modification of the North Carolina
order.22' The father was then living in Virginia, and he objected,
asserting Virginia was the proper jurisdiction.2 22 The New York
court determined that North Carolina had continuing exclusive
jurisdiction and dismissed the case. 2 3 The wife then registered
the North Carolina order in New York family court, and in March
213. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1024-25.
214. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1027.
215. 60 Va. App. 721, 732 S.E.2d 714 (2012).
216. Id. at 724, 732 S.E.2d at 716.
217. Id. at 724-25, 732 S.E.2d at 716.
218. Id.
219. Id. (alterations in original).
220. Id. at 724, 732 S.E.2d at 716.
221. Id. at 725, 732 S.E.2d at 716.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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2010 the New York court entered an order regarding the child's
dental expenses.224
In June 2010, the North Carolina court placed the case in "in-
active status" because the child had reached the age of eighteen,
but two weeks later the court set aside that order because it had
been entered without notice to the mother, another state was en-
forcing the order, and neither party resided in North Carolina.22 5
In 2011, acting on behalf of the mother, Virginia DCSE moved for
leave to register the North Carolina order in the Chesterfield
County JDR court.226 The father objected and moved for a deter-
mination of the "controlling order" under UIFSA.227 The trial court
held that the 1997 North Carolina order was the controlling order
and that the North Carolina order provided for child support
through age twenty-one because it had not modified the 1994
New York order, which so provided, in that respect. 228 The father
was therefore liable for child support through age twenty-one,
and the North Carolina order could be registered as a judgment.2 29
The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing with the trial court
that the North Carolina order was controlling because it met the
requirements for a controlling order set forth in UIFSA. 230 The
original New York order, which it modified, had been properly en-
tered at the time under New York law because both parties were
then residents in New York, but under New York law, the courts
of that state lost continuing jurisdiction after both parties and the
child had established residency elsewhere.' In turn, the North
Carolina court obtained jurisdiction when the mother and child
established residency there, and under the North Carolina
UIFSA, its courts had continuing jurisdiction until the order was
modified by a court in another state, which had not happened.2 32
224. Id. at 725-26, 732 S.E.2d at 716.
225. Id. at 726, 732 S.E.2d at 717.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 727, 732 S.E.2d at 717.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 733-36, 732 S.E.2d at 720-22; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.66 (Repl. Vol.
2008) ("A support order ... issued by a tribunal of another state may be registered in this
Commonwealth for enforcement.").
231. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 580-205 (Consol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2013); Moncrief, 60 Va.
App. at 734-35, 732 S.E.2d at 721.
232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52C-2-205 (2012); Moncrief, 60 Va. App. at 735-36, 732 S.E.2d
at 721-22.
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As the most recent order by a court with jurisdiction, the North
Carolina order was controlling.23 3
B. Legislative Changes
Virginia Code section 20-124.3 has been amended to add a fur-
ther requirement to the statute requiring a court to communicate
the basis of its decision either orally or in writing to the parties,
as follows: "Except in cases of consent orders for custody and vis-
itation, this communication shall set forth the judge's findings re-
garding the relevant factors set forth in this section."" Thus, the
court must not only put its findings on the record but must go fac-
tor by factor in doing so. In my experience, most judges have been
doing this anyway, but the statute makes clear that it is a re-
quirement.
VIII. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND ADOPTION 235
A. Case Law
1. Father of Child Conceived by In Vitro Fertilization Is Child's
Legal Parent
In L.F. v. Breit, father and mother had lived together unmar-
ried for several years and tried to have a child (the traditional
way), but were unable to do so.23 They then successfully attempt-
ed in vitro fertilization with the mother's egg and father's
sperm.23 Before the child's birth, the mother and father entered
into an agreement on custody and visitation, and the day after
the child's birth they both signed an Acknowledgment of Paterni-
ty under oath.238 They were named as mother and father on the
233. Moncrief, 60 Va. App. at 736, 732 S.E.2d at 722 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
88.41(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2008)).
234. Act of Mar. 23, 2012, ch. 358, 2012 Va. Acts 626, 626 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
235. The case of Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 189-90, 192, 715 S.E.2d 11, 14, 16
(2011), addressing the application of the Virginia statute on forfeiture of parental rights
after six months absence of contact between parent and child, and Virginia Code sec-
tion 63.2-1202(H) (Repl. Vol. 2012), is the subject of a separate article and is simply noted
here.
236. 285 Va. 163, 171, 736 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2013).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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child's birth certificate, and the child's surname was their two
names hyphenated.2 "
A year after the child's birth, the mother attempted to cut off
all contact between father and child.2 40 The trial court held that
the father could not be recognized as a legal parent because of
Virginia Code section 20-158, which, in essence, provides that the
sperm donor for a baby conceived through "assisted conception"
has no parental rights unless he is the husband of the mother. 4
The court of appeals reversed, giving precedence to Virginia Code
section 20-49.1(B)(2), which states in part:
The parent and child relationship between a child and a man may be
established by ... [a] voluntary written statement of the father and
mother made under oath acknowledging paternity.... A written
statement shall have the same legal effect as a judgment . . . and
shall be binding and conclusive [absent] fraud, duress, or a material
mistake of fact.
The mother then obtained review in the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia, which affirmed the court of appeals. 243 The supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that the statute on acknowledg-
ment of paternity prevailed over the statute on assisted concep-
tion.24 The latter statute was intended to protect married couples
against the claims of a third party, not to insulate mothers
against a biological father who they themselves had acknowl-
edged as a parent.2 45
The Supreme Court of Virginia also held that adopting the
mother's argument would cause a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process.246 In Troxel v. Granville,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a parent has a
constitutional right to participate in decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of his or her child. 247 Allowing the stat-
239. Id.
240. Id. at 171-72, 736 S.E.2d at 715.
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Breit, 285 Va.
at 172, 736 S.E.2d at 716.
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49. 1(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Breit, 285 Va.
at 172, 736 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Breit v. Mason, 59 Va. App. 322, 337-38, 718 S.E.2d
482, 489 (2011)).
243. Breit, 285 Va. at 179-80, 736 S.E.2d at 720.
244. Id., 736 S.E.2d at 719-20.
245. Id., 736 S.E.2d at 720.
246. Id. at 181-84, 736 S.E.2d at 721-22.
247. 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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ute on assisted conception to prevail over the statute on acknowl-
edgment of paternity would violate the father's constitutionally
protected liberty interest in raising his child. "[T]here is no com-
pelling reason why a responsible, involved, unmarried, biological
parent should never be allowed to establish legal parentage of his
or her child born as a result of assisted conception." In L.F. v.
Breit, before the mother cut the father out of the child's life, the
father was an active participant; the Supreme Court of Virginia
seemed to say that because of the evidence of this early participa-
tion in the child's life, the father, as in the decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Lehr v. Robertson, had ac-
quired "substantial protection under the Due Process clause.""'
The mother's final argument to the Supreme Court of Virginia
was that acknowledgments of paternity are unenforceable be-
cause they violate a child's right to not have a parent.250 The court
made short work of this argument because "children also have a
liberty interest in establishing relationships with their par-
ents."m
2. Virginia Law Recognizes Cause of Action for Tortious
Interference with Parental Rights
The decision in Wyatt v. McDermott resulted from a request
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia for answers to certified questions of law submitted to the
Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to article VI, section 1 of the
Virginia Constitution and Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 5:40.252
The plaintiff was the father of an infant whom the mother, with-
out the father's knowledge or consent, arranged to have adopt-
ed .2 " At the instigation of a Virginia attorney (who was a named
defendant in the case), whom the mother's parents had turned to
248. Breit, 285 Va. at 183, 736 S.E.2d at 722.
249. 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1980); Breit, 285 Va. at 182-83, 736 S.E.2d at 721-22.
250. Breit, 285 Va. at 184, 736 S.E.2d at 723.
251. Id. at 185, 736 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 7
Va. App. 614, 622, 376 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1989)); see also Wooddell v. Lagerquist, No. 2121-
11-3, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 374, at *18 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (unpublished decision)
(recognizing that an acknowledgment of paternity is conclusive unless obtained through
fraud, duress, or mutual mistake).
252. 283 Va. 685, 689, 725 S.E.2d 555, 556 (2012); see also VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1; VA.
SUP. CT. R. 5:40 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
253. Wyatt, 283 Va. at 690, 726 S.E.2d at 557.
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for assistance in having the child placed for adoption, the mother
kept assuring the father that she wanted to keep the child and
raise it with the father as a family of three.2  Meanwhile, the
mother was signing papers consenting to adoption and falsely al-
leging on those forms that she did not know the father's wherea-
bouts.2 55 She also concealed the birth of the baby from the fa-
ther-the child was born two weeks early-and that she had
allowed the putative adoptive parents to pick up the baby in Vir-
ginia and begin adoption proceedings in Utah, where they lived.2 6
At the time suit was filed in the Virginia federal court, an
adoption proceeding was pending in Utah and the child was living
with the putative adoptive parents.' Because the child was born
in Virginia, the father brought suit in Virginia federal court seek-
ing damages for the unauthorized adoption and also a declaration
under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act that Virginia was
the proper venue for determining the validity of the adoption.2 8
The federal court certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia the
issue of whether Virginia recognized a cause of action for tortious
interference with parental rights.2
The Supreme Court of Virginia, by a 4-3 vote, held that Virgin-
ia does recognize an action for tortious interference with parental
rights.2"o The majority was forced to concede that there was no
statutory basis for such a tort and that no prior decision had ever
expressly recognized it.26' The concessions made by the majority
were the reasons why three justices dissented-if a new cause of
action was to be created, it should be done by statute, not court
decision.2 " The majority, however, based their reasoning on the
protection of the parental relationship contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The major-
ity invoked Chavez v. Johnson, in which for the first time the Su-
preme Court of Virginia recognized the common-law tort of
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 690-91, 725 S.E.2d at 557.
258. Id. at 691, 725 S.E.2d at 557; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).
259. Id., 725 S.E.2d at 558.
260. Id. at 703, 725 S.E.2d at 564.
261. Id. at 692, 725 S.E.2d at 558.
262. Id. at 704-05, 725 S.E.2d at 564-65 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
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interference with contract rights.2 63 In Chavez, there had been no
prior explicit recognition of such a tort, but the tort had existed at
common law, so the Supreme Court of Virginia was not creating a
new tort but recognizing an existing one.'" For the Supreme
Court of Virginia not to recognize the tort of interference with pa-
rental rights would be to leave a wrong with no remedy. The Wy-
att opinion goes on to define the elements of the tort by incorpo-
rating standards set out in a case from West Virginia.265 Finally,
at the end of the majority opinion, Justice Millette articulated the
public policy reasoning behind the majority opinion by stating:
"[W]e hope that the threat of a civil action would help deter third
parties such as attorneys and adoption agencies from engaging in
the sort of actions alleged to have taken place."266
3. Five-Day Hearing Requirement Is Not Jurisdictional
The parents in Marrison v. Fairfax County Department of Fam-
ily Services neglected their children to the point where one of
them died of apparent starvation."' The Department of Family
Services removed the survivors pursuant to an emergency remov-
al order on February 1, 2010, but the hearing on the abuse and
neglect petitions did not occur until February 18, 2010."' The un-
surprising result was that the JDR court found abuse and neglect
and sustained the removal.269 That decision was sustained on ap-
peal to the circuit court. 27 0 The parents argued that the hearing
came too late and that the courts therefore had no jurisdiction to
remove their children, relying on Virginia Code section 16.1-
251(B), which states that a hearing on emergency removal "shall
be held ... as soon as practicable, but in no event later than five
business days after the removal of the child."271
263. Id. at 692-93, 725 S.E.2d at 558 (citing Chavez v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119-20,
335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985)).
264. Chavez v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119-20, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985).
265. Wyatt, 283 Va. at 698-99, 701, 725 S.E.2d at 562-63 (citing Kessel v. Leavitt, 511
S.E.2d 720, 761 n.44, 765-66 (W. Va. 1998)).
266. Id. at 703, 725 S.E.2d at 564.
267. 59 Va. App. 61, 64-65, 717 S.E.2d 146, 147-48 (2011).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 66, 717 S.E.2d at 148.
270. Id.
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-251 (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2013); Marrison, 59 Va.
App. at 65-66, 717 S.E.2d at 148.
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The court of appeals held that the relevant timeliness was that
of the JDR court, because the circuit court's jurisdiction was de-
rivative of the JDR court's jurisdiction.2 72 The court of appeals
framed the issue as whether the statute in question imposed a ju-
risdictional requirement or a procedural one, concluding that it
was the latter.273 In Virginia, the use of "shall" in a statute is or-
dinarily directive, rather than jurisdictional, and unless the af-
fected parties can show prejudice to them from the lateness of the
proceeding, lateness alone is not grounds for a holding that the
proceeding cannot go forward. Here, the parents had shown no
prejudice, so the order of the JDR court, as affirmed in the order
of the circuit court, was effective."
B. Legislative Changes
The General Assembly has enacted a law declaring the right of
parents to make decisions regarding their children. It is suffi-
ciently succinct that it can be quoted in its entirety:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That the Code of Virginia is amended by adding a section num-
bered 1-240.1 as follows:
§ 1-240.1. Rights of parents.
A parent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
upbringing, education, and care of the parent's child.
2. That it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that
this act codify the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in L.F. v.
Breit, issued on January 10, 2013, as it relates to parental rights.2 75
Only the italicized portion is incorporated into the Virginia
Code.7 6
The General Assembly enacted new Virginia Code section 16.1-
283.2 to provide a procedure for the restoration of parental rights
if the child is fourteen years of age or older, the parent and child
both consent, the child has not achieved the permanency goal or
the goal was achieved but not sustained, and the rights were
terminated at least two years before the filing of the petition.7
272. Marrison, 59 Va. App. at 68, 717 S.E.2d at 149.
273. Id. at 69, 717 S.E.2d at 150.
274. Id. at 68-71, 717 S.E.2d at 150-51.
275. Act of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 678, 2013 Va. Acts _,_ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
276. See VA. CODE ANN. § 1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
277. Act of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 685, 2013 Va. Acts _, _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
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The statute also provides a procedure for restoring parental
rights to younger siblings even if they are younger than four-
teen."' The court must hold a hearing, and the parent must prove
his or her ability to care for the child by clear and convincing evi-
dence.7 If the petition is approved, the law provides for involve-
ment by Social Services in monitoring and assisting the parent
and child.2"o After approximately six months, a second hearing is
to be held at which point the court will determine whether to
make the restoration permanent and issue an appropriate or-
der.281
Virginia Code section 63.2-1509 has been amended in several
respects in apparent reaction to the Penn State child sex abuse
scandal. One amendment adds the following to the classes of peo-
ple required to report to authorities if they have reason to believe
that a child is abused or neglected: "Any athletic coach, director
or other person 18 years of age or older employed by or volunteer-
ing with a private sports organization or team" and "Administra-
tors or employees 18 years of age or older of public or private day
camps, youth centers and youth recreation programs."282 Another
amendment adds the following required reporting class: "Any
person employed by a public or private institution of higher edu-
cation other than an attorney who is employed by a public or pri-
vate institution of higher education as it relates to information
gained in the course of providing legal representation to a cli-
ent."283 Yet another amendment to the same section now requires
reporting "as soon as possible, but not longer than 24 hours after
having reason to suspect a reportable offense.,2" Finally, an
amendment provides that anyone who knowingly and intentional-
ly fails to report an instance specifically of sexual abuse is guilty
of a Class I misdemeanor.
16.1-283.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013)).
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283.2 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Act of Mar. 30, 2012, ch. 391, 2012 Va. Acts 669, 670 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
283. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 698, 2012 Va. Acts 1431, 1432 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
284. Act of Apr. 18, 2012, ch. 740, 2012 Va. Acts 1566, 1567 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
285. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 728, 2012 Va. Acts 1518, 1519 (codified as amended at VA.
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Virginia Code section 63.2-1709.3 has been added to provide a
"conscience clause" for adoption agencies which states "no private
child-placing agency shall be required to perform, assist, counsel,
recommend, consent to, refer, or participate in any placement of a
child for foster care or adoption when the proposed placement
would violate the agency's written religious or moral convictions
or policies."286 Additional provisions bar any adverse administra-
tive action or suit for damages against an agency asserting its
rights under this provision."'
IX. CONCLUSION
One lesson of recent decisions is that a party's position can be
seriously affected by matters occurring beyond the scope of litiga-
tion and even ordinary bargaining. A husband can spend more
than a million dollars in marital assets after separation and per-
suade a court that no waste was involved. A spouse can designate
a beneficiary for his or her federal life insurance and have the
designation be effective even if a PSA provides otherwise. Child
custody can be resolved simply by taking the child to a faraway
jurisdiction so that even if there is a theoretical remedy in Ameri-
can courts, the likelihood of success is near zero. Practitioners
may need to take immediate proactive steps, or have their client
do so, starting perhaps as early as the very day the retainer is
signed, lest assets or rights be lost by default.
Even so, for the most part, recent statutory enactments and
court decisions in Virginia have made small but real advances
toward vindication of parties' rights and simplification of proce-
dure. If progress has been evolutionary rather than revolution-
ary, things are at least going in the right direction. Let us hope
that continues.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Supp. 2013)).
286. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 715, 2012 Va. Acts 1498, 1498 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
63.2-1709.3 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
287. Id.
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